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Introduction 
Recent reforms have been transforming the structure of local governance in the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC) region. Since the 1990s, a critical objective of 
governance reform has been the strengthening of local government by the 
decentralization of powers, resources and responsibilities to local authorities and other 
locally administered bodies. These reforms have been labelled ‘democratic 
decentralization’ by scholars (Ribot, 2004; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004). Democratic 
decentralization refers to initiatives which entail the transfer of significant authority, 
responsibility for services, fiscal and human resources to local governance. The objective 
of the reforms was to capacitate local governance structures, as well as to increase the 
capacity and productivity of the public sector in general (Hope & Chikulo, 2000). Efforts 
to improve institutional effectiveness, accountability and service delivery at the local 
level thus have been a major focus throughout the region. 
 
The Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) was signed on July 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, replacing the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which had been in existence 
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since 1980. South Africa joined SADC in 1994 followed by Mauritius in 1995, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997 and Seychelles in 1997.1  The issue of 
local government and municipalisation lies at the core of the SADC vision. To this end, 
almost all governments in the region have committed themselves to the establishment of 
decentralized democratic local governance. Consequently, over the past decade most 
governments have chosen to devolve, to varying degrees, authority, responsibility, 
resources and autonomy to elected local authorities. 
 
This paper examines and reviews the issues and challenges that governments in the 
SADC region are facing in their efforts to establish democratic, developmental local 
governance. 
 
Emerging key issues and challenges  
As indicated above, legal, policy and institutional frameworks have been put in place to 
establish and democratise local governments with the objective of deepening democracy, 
and improving service delivery, local development and management. The reform process 
therefore holds considerable promise with specific regard to: enhancing transparency and 
accountability; facilitating citizen participation; facilitating effective and efficient public 
service delivery; and integrating society with the state. However, despite the significant 
progress achieved since the local governance reforms were set in motion, there are still 
some significant outstanding contentious issues that need to be resolved before the 
effective implementation of the reform programmes can be finalised. The key issues are 
as follows: 
• Lack of political will or authority 
• Absence of a holistic development framework 
• Ineffective institutionalisation of local participation committees  
• Management capacity constraints and deficits 
• Fiscal crisis 
• Role of traditional authorities 
• Weak links civil society organisations 
• Undemocratic behaviour by ruling regimes.  
 
1  SADC member states are now: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
 
 Democratic local governance in the 





 CJLG March 2010 147 
 
Resistance to political will 
The reforms in the SADC region seem to reflect considerable ‘political will’ to transfer 
authority and responsibilities to lower tiers of government, and significant progress has 
been made. However, the main problems which are acknowledged in most of the studies 
is foot-dragging or a lack of cooperation from central ministries, and reluctance to 
transfer sufficient functions and powers to local governance structures, since doing so 
would greatly reduce their own power (Olowu, 2001; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; 
Chinsinga, 2008; Ashley,et al, 2008). In the case of Mozambique, it has been pointed out 
that the emerging picture is one of “continued commitment to centralism” (Ashley et Al, 
2008:6). In some countries central ministries dominate local authorities, and in others, 
cooperation between sectoral ministries and local government is lacking (UN, 2004; 
World Bank, 2007). Another development in countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe is 
the manoeuvre by some key sectoral ministries to re-centralise activities by setting up 
their own parallel sector specific coordination boards at the district level (Stewart, 1994). 
Lack of political authority to overcome such obstruction results in misdirected or 
incomplete implementation of decentralisation policies, which may ultimately undermine 
efforts to establish sustainable and inclusive local authorities. Fledgling local authorities 
find themselves competing with centres of authority at district level. 
 
Development planning and management 
There is a lack of holistic, integrated planning and management at district level. The 
common structure for development planning in most countries is the District 
Development Committee (DDC), chaired by central government’s district representative, 
with membership consisting of all the heads of central government departments and 
parastatal bodies, MPs, plus representatives of political parties, local authorities, business 
and community based organizations. These committees are thus dominated by central 
government appointees (Makumbe, 1999; Chishinga, 2008) and chaired not by an elected 
local authority official, but a political appointee who is the alter ego of the President, 
called a District Administrator (DA). The role of DAs has tended to be controversial: as 
political appointees, they often focus mostly on strengthening the ruling party structures 
at district level, rather than coordinating socio-economic development programmes.  
 
Effective integrated planning and management is therefore undermined by the absence of 
an effective coordinating mechanism under the direct control of local authorities. The 
 
 Democratic local governance in the 





 CJLG March 2010 148 
 
local authorities have no legal administrative authority over central government line 
departments. The deconcentrated sector ministries which provide services within a local 
council’s area of jurisdiction report and account upwards direct to their parent ministries. 
Thus they remain primarily answerable to their ministerial chain of command. 
Furthermore, the development committees’ relationships to other community and local 
structures is not well defined. Consequently, the residents are denied an effective voice. 
 
Although South Africa has different arrangements, and legally a stronger role for local 
government, observers such as Bardill and Tapscott (2000) have nonetheless identified 
weaknesses in intergovernmental relations, with poor coordination among various levels 
and departments of government. Furthermore, as Ashley et al have aptly observed, in 
spite of commitment to decentralization, political and institutional power still resides at 
the centre: “The resources and responsibilities vested in the local sphere of government 
continue to set largely by other spheres of government, particularly line departments at 
provincial levels, such as Water Affairs, Public Works and Housing” (Ashley et al, 
2008:8). 
 
According to the Municipal Systems Act 2000, South African municipalities must 
prepare Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) for their areas, and extensive community 
participation in both the content of an IDP and the process by which it is drafted is 
compulsory. In short, it is supposed to be a ‘bottom-up’ participatory process. However, 
IDPs must be aligned with provincial and national government plans, and in most 
instances this means that development projects are only approved when they fit into 
central government plans and vision (Oluwu & Wunsch, 2004). As a result, planning still 
tends to be top-down and, due to lack of skills and resources in municipalities, often is 
‘consultant-driven’ with only token community participation. 
 
Throughout the region, the existence of parallel national and provincial government 
departments working through their district offices complicates development planning and 
service delivery (Ashley et al, 2008), with the end result that service delivery and 
development projects at district level are determined through a top-down process. This 
impairs effective and efficient public service delivery that is responsive to local needs, 
and undermines the autonomy and authority of local governance. Moreover, the growth 
in development project aid channeled directly to communities, bypassing local 
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government structures, not only exacerbates the problem of coordinating and monitoring 
local development activities but also undermines community-local government linkages. 
The challenge is again one of local versus national department development interests, 
and the problem of being able to account for, and coordinate development projects 
sponsored by different departments and donors. 
 
Ineffective participatory committees 
At the sub- district and local level, in all the countries, a network of committees has been 
created to serve as a mechanism for representation, participation and accountability in 
development management and planning. The introduction of such committees – district, 
settlement, ward or village development committees – is an important innovation in the 
effort to enhance participatory local democracy. It is therefore an important component 
of local governance reform in the region. However, in the majority of countries, these 
committee networks have not been effectively institutionalized. In South Africa, for 
example, the principle of participation is entrenched in the constitution which requires 
local government to “encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organizations in matters of local government” (RSA, 1996:81). Furthermore, the 
Municipal Systems Act 2000 obligates local government to establish mechanisms to 
enable communities to participate in ward committees. However, these committees in 
general have not been effective channels and there is a lack of connectivity between 
communities and municipalities as a result (de Visser, 2009; Christmas & de Visser, 
2009; Pycroft, 2000a). As Atkinson (2001) has observed, although wards are government 
created platforms for community engagement with local government, communities in 
South Africa still elect to take their grievances to the streets. Evidence in other countries 
also suggests that for the most part, the network of development committees is not very 
active, and in some cases they only exist on paper (Chinsinga, 2008; Chikulo, 2009). As 




Management capacity deficit is a major hindrance to effective local governance. There is 
insufficient human resources capacity to cope with the multiplicity of mandates which 
have to be carried out more or less simultaneously by the decentralised democratic local 
governance structures. With the exception of Zimbabwe, which until the recent political 
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and economic melt-down, was said to possess a decent quality of municipal government 
staff, the scarcity of qualified staff – especially professional and technical staff – has 
been a major constraint for most of the local authorities in the region (Chikulo, 2004; 
Sperfeld, 2005). The result is a barrier to effective and efficient development 
management.  
 
Lack of capacity has been cited in Malawi and Mozambique by Kithakye (1997) 
and.Sperfeld (2008). In South Africa, the problem of the shortage of skilled manpower is 
widespread, and in some instances was exacerbated by the exodus of experienced 
municipal managers from council employment (Pycroft, 2000b). De Visser and 
Christmas 2009 also argue that lack of capacity has been exacerbated by appointments 
based on political patronage rather than skills and expertise. Pycroft (2002) has noted 
that while municipal capacity tends to be concentrated within metropolitan 
municipalities, administrative capacity deficit is prevalent at district level. 
 
The problem is exacerbated in rural municipalities by their remoteness from urban 
centres. In South Africa, it is difficult to attract a high calibre of municipal officers to 
these areas where working conditions may be difficult. Rural local authorities thus lack 
the organizational, technical and administrative capabilities to fulfil their mandate. 
Consequently, as Harrison points out: “many local authorities in South Africa are so 
weak institutionally that they cannot perform even the most basic functions of 
management, service delivery, a sophisticated level of integrated and coordinated 
planning remains a long way off” (Harrison 2001:191).  
Under such circumstances, councils have struggled to fulfil their responsibilities in terms 
of the constitution and the relevant local government legislation. Administrative capacity 
deficits should therefore be seen as a common, ongoing problem for most local 
authorities in the region. In recent years, recognition that decentralisation is often been 




Another fundamental problem which has afflicted local governance in the region over the 
past decades has been the gap between financial resources and municipal expenditure 
needs, coupled with inadequate financial management systems. The taxing powers of 
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local authorities are not wide enough, and the yield from existing sources is in most cases 
inadequate, to meet their expanding expenditures for both development and recurrent 
services. Consequently, dependency on central government grants is a common feature 
of local government in the region. Even South Africa, which is characterized by a high 
degree of fiscal decentralization, and where local government is entitled to an equitable 
share of nation revenue, the majority of local authorities are highly dependent on central 
government. 
 
There are a number of issues relating to the financial crisis most local authorities are 
facing. The first is that the ability of local authorities to derive adequate revenue from 
their own local sources, such as property taxes and service charges, is constrained by 
central government restrictions imposed for fear of eroding political support among the 
urban populace (such as was the case in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Chikulo, 2006 ; 
Maipose, 2003; Sharma, 2003). Secondly, most local authorities in rural areas lack the 
capacity to generate enough revenue to meet their mandates: they have a concentration of 
poor residents and limited commercial or industrial activity which means that their tax 
base, whether from individual households rates, service payments or levies on 
commercial activity is minimal. Third, local authorities, especially in South Africa, 
continue to face a ‘culture of non-payment’ of charges for basic services, mainly by 
township dwellers, a habit which has origins the apartheid legacy. This has resulted in 
massive accumulated deficits from non-payment of such services as refuse collection and 
water supplies (Pycroft, 2002; Nel & Binns, 2001). Fourth, local governments suffer 
from increasing ‘unfunded mandates’ – although additional responsibilities have been 
devolved to local governance, appropriate levels of funding have not followed (Nel & 
Binns, 2002; Smith, 2001; Chinsinga, 2008). Finally, poor financial management in local 
authorities, such as inadequate financial and budgetary management systems, and poor 
record-keeping, often results in the mismanagement of scarce financial resources. The 
above financial constraints raise the issue of fiscal autonomy or sovereignty, which lies 
at the heart of the issue of local governance responsiveness and effective service 
delivery.  
 
Most local authorities have limited autonomy with respect to revenue and expenditures, 
as most grants from central government are conditional and earmarked for specific 
projects. Financial dependence on central government also tends to limit the scope for 
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establishing independent positions on development policy issues. Thus, until such time as 
local authorities become capable of raising significant amounts of their own revenue – as 
envisaged in most of the decentralisation policies of the governments in the region – the 
mentality of ‘he who pays the piper, calls the tune’ is bound to continue. In other words, 
service delivery and development will continue to be ‘supply driven’ instead of ‘demand 
driven’, as most local governments in the region remain upwardly accountable to central 
ministries. Thus the financial crisis faced by most local governments is a serious 
impediment to effective public service delivery and good governance. Without financial 
sustainability, local governments are unable to govern effectively or provide services to 
their communities, and their developmental capacity and autonomy are undermined.  
 
Traditional leadership and local governance 
A recurring issue in decentralised local governance reform is the status and role of 
traditional leaders. Reconciling traditional authorities and local government has become 
a major contentious policy and constitutional issue in Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe (Ndiyepa, 2001; Reddy & Naidu, 2007). During the colonial era, 
traditional authorities were assigned powers either in competition with or directly over 
elected local authorities. In the immediate post-independence era, the democratisation of 
local government undermined the political control of traditional authorities, with 
traditional leaders resisting the loss of previous considerable powers to control access to 
resources (land, water, livelihoods), to arbitration mechanisms, and to services such as 
education and health. Obviously, traditional authorities also objected to the new 
municipal boundaries which cut across rural districts and tribal land.  
 
An issue that is still under debate is how traditional authorities should participate in local 
governance. In Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland traditional authorities are 
recognised as a fourth level of local government. In these countries, the devolution of 
political and administrative powers may have somewhat re-invigorated traditional 
authorities and given them a new lease of life (Ntsebeza, 1999). In Botswana, for 
instance, chiefs have many responsibilities including law and order, administration of 
justice and serving as spokesperson for their tribes. The chief, who is also the head of the 
tribal administration, is by virtue of his position an ex officio member of the district 
council. Even in those instances where no tribal authorities are officially recognised, 
traditional leaders are represented on local authorities as a means for institutionalising 
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legitimate local governance. Traditional leaders have therefore demanded an active role 
in democratically elected institutions, especially at the local government level (Jones, 
2000). 
 
In recent years, however, chiefs in Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa have increasingly sought to reassert their authority (Ribot, 2002). They feel that 
their authority has been undermined by the transfer of control over allocation of 
resources such as land, and other legitimate powers to local authorities. Consequently, 
they are re-emerging as a political force against what they perceive to be a diminution of 
their role, which new forms of local governance have reinforced and institutionalised.  In 
South Africa, the institutional of traditional leadership is recognised in the constitution, 
although their roles and functions are not adequately clarified, resulting in tensions 
between chiefs and elected councillors. Despite provisions in the Municipal Structures 
Amendment Act that allow traditional leaders to participate in council meetings, in an ex 
officio capacity, traditional authorities are still at loggerheads with new councils. The 
challenge posed by the tension between traditional authorities and local governments 
remain pervasive in most Southern African countries and may negate effective local 
governance. The challenge is how to draw on the strengths of traditional authorities 
while reinforcing and legitimating democratic local government. 
 
Links with civil society 
Non-government organisations (NGOs) and community-based groups (CBOs) are 
normally seen to be pivotal in the provision of participatory and responsive development. 
It is argued that NGOs and CBOs should work closely with local government and where 
necessary compete with them or replace them. Thus NGOs and CBOs are expected to 
play a critical role in democratic decentralisation by providing services, lobbying 
government to provide greater services, and making people aware of their rights. 
However, it has also been observed that NGOs and CBOs in some instances may have a 
negative impact on local governance and hence on the foundations for effective 
democratic decentralisation. Collier (1996) has elaborated on instances where NGOs 
tried to undermine the development of local governments that are seen as a threat to their 
powerful position in the community (Smith, 2001).  
However, in the Southern African region, the participation of NGOs and civil society in 
local governance remains minimal. Despite the legal mandate in South Africa for civil 
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society participation in the local governance process, civil society engagement with local 
government is often viewed to be ineffective, inconsistent or lacking altogether. The civil 
society sector, including NGOs and CBOs, still find it difficult to engage and partner 
with local government in promoting development. Consequently, many CBOs are unable 
to influence local governance in a manner that would effectively benefit their 
communities. It has also been generally observed that local authorities have been 
reluctant to embrace and engage civil society, NGOs and CBOs and to give effect to 
principles of participatory governance. This robs local governments of valuable 
opportunities which could reinvigorate their development. 
 
Undemocratic behavior by ruling regimes 
In recent years, some regimes in the region have deliberately undermined the 
effectiveness of local governance in order to pursue their party political agenda. In 
Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF regime began to undermine what had been strong and efficient 
urban municipalities, after the previously weak opposition movement, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC), became reinvigorated into a strong opposition party and 
made major in-roads. The MDC not only increasing its representation in parliament but 
also won control of most urban councils after 2001. Similarly, in Malawi since the tenure 
of councillors who were elected during the first local elections held in November 2000 
expired in May 2005, no elections have been held to date. Consequently, there are no 
local government councillors to represent the residents. The indefinite postponement of 
local government elections is politically motivated and has been mainly attributed to the 
ruling party’s (Democratic Progressive Party) fear of losing in the local polls (Chinsinga, 
2008). In Lesotho too, following the 1993 general elections that were won by the 
Basotho Congress party (BCP), parliament subsequently passed the Local Government 
Act No.6 1997, but the Act did not come into operation due to political factors until 
2005, when the local government councils were finally elected (Sperfeld, 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
Local governance in the SADC region has been given a pivotal and distinctive role in the 
promotion of sustainable socio-economic development and deepening democracy at the 
sub-national level. This recognition of the developmental role of local government has 
given local authorities a new dynamic as instruments of sustainable development and 
effective service delivery. However, although significant progress has been made in 
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establishing the institutional structure and policy framework to facilitate and anchor 
effective delivery of public services and socio-economic development, key issues and 
challenges persist that are unlikely to be resolved in the near future.  
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